Abstract. We present an approach for proving behavioral properties of numerical programs by analyzing their compiled assembly code. We focus on the issues and traps that may arise on oating-point computations. Direct analysis of the assembly code allows us to take into account architecture-or compiler-dependent features such as the possible use of extended precision registers.
Introduction
The C language is the rst choice for embedded systems or critical software from domains such as simulation of physical systems, control-command programs in transportation, etc. For such systems, oating-point (FP for short) computations are involved and precision of calculations is an important issue. The IEEE-754 standard [1] enforces a precise denition on how the basic arithmetic operations (+, -, *, /, and also absolute value, square root, etc.) must be computed on a given FP format (32 bits, 64 bits, etc.) and w.r.t a given rounding mode.
This standard is currently supported by most of the processor chips. However, this does not imply that a given C program must produce exactly the same results whatever is the compiler and the underlying architecture. There are for that several possible reasons, e.g. the x87 oating-point unit (FPU) uses 80-bit internal oating-point registers, FMA instructions compute xy ± z with a single rounding, or the compiler may optimize the assembly code by changing the order of operations. Such issues have been extensively analyzed by D. Monniaux [27] .
A small example that illustrates such an issue is as follows. double doublerounding() { double x = 1.0; double y = 0x1p-53 + 0x1p-64; double z = x + y; return z; } This work was partly funded by the U3CAT project (ANR-08-SEGI-021, http: //frama-c.com/u3cat/) of the French national research organization (ANR), and the Hisseo project, funded by Digiteo (http://hisseo.saclay.inria.fr/)
If computations follow the IEEE-754 standard, the result should be 1 + 2 −52 , but if compiled using the x87 FPU, a double rounding happens and the result is 1. The latter compilation does not strictly follows the standard 3 .
In the context of static verication, FP computations have been considered in part. In analyses based on the abstract interpretation framework, support for FP computations is proposed in tools like Fluctuat [20] , Astrée [17] and the Value analysis of Frama-C [18] . Generally speaking, FP arithmetic has been formalized since 1989 to formally prove hardware components or algorithms [14, 24, 32] .
However, there are very few attempts to analyze FP programs in the socalled extended static checking techniques, or deductive verication techniques, where verication is typically performed by producing proof obligations, which are formulas to be shown valid using theorem provers. In this context, complex behavioral properties are formally specied using specication languages such as JML [12] for Java, ACSL [7] for C, Spec# [4] for C#. The support for oatingpoint computations in such approaches is poorly studied. In 2006, Leavens [25] enumerates a set of possible traps when one attempts to specify FP programs. In 2007, Boldo and Filliâtre [8] propose both a specication language to specify FP programs and an approach to generate proof obligations to be proved in the Coq proof assistant. In 2010, Ayad and Marché [2] extended this to the support of special values and to the use of automated theorem provers. However, the former approaches assume that the compiler strictly follows the IEEE-754 standard. In other words, on the example above they can prove that the result is 1 + 2 −52 .
In 2010, Boldo and Nguyen [9, 10] proposed a deductive verication approach which is compiler-and architecture-independent, is the sense that the behavioral properties that can be proved valid on a FP program are true whatever does the compiler (up to some extent). On the same example, the only property that can be proved is that the result is between 1 and 1 + 2 −52 . In this paper, we propose an approach which is compiler-and architecture-dependent: the requirements are proved valid with respect to the assembly code generated by the compiler.
At the level of the assembly, all architecture-dependent information is known, such as the precision of each operation. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the approach from a user's point of view, and is largely illustrated by examples. Section 3 explains the technicalities of our approach, which consists in translating annotations and assembly instructions into the Why intermediate language [23] . Conclusions and future work will be presented in the last section.
2 Overview of the approach Fig. 1 presents all the steps to prove an annotated C program by analyzing its assembly code. The specication language we consider is ACSL [7] , where 3 The term strict here refers to the -fp-model strict or /fp:strict options of C compilers, or the strictfp keyword of Java, which explicitly requires the compilation to strictly conform to the standard. Step-by-step from C program to WHY proof obligations annotations are put in comments. To transport these annotations into the generated assembly, we have a preprocessing step in which we rewrite annotations as inline assembly. Assembly code is then generated from this new C source by the regular gcc compiler to generate assembly code, with precise architecturerelated options, e.g. -mfpmath=387 to generate x87 assembly or -On to optimize at level n. The main original step is then a translation of the assembly code to a Why program. This is implemented by modifying the GNU assembler so as to produce Why source instead of binary object. The Why environment is nally invoked to generate proof obligations, and prove them by automatic provers such as Gappa [26] , Alt-Ergo [16] , CVC3 [5] , Z3 [19] or interactive provers like Coq [33] .
Example: double-rounding
To illustrate this process, let's add a specication in the short program given in introduction under the form of an ACSL assertion: double doublerounding() { double x = 1.0; double y = 0x1p-53 + 0x1p-64; double z = x + y; //@ assert z == 1.0; return z; } The assembly code generated with our tools in the x87 mode is shown in Fig. 2 . Notice on line 16 how the inline assembly preprocessing allowed to replace the occurrence of z in the assertion by its assembly counterpart. Notice also that the rst addition is computed at compile-time (line 9), whereas the second one is compiled into x87 instructions (lines [11] [12] [13] [14] . When this assembly code is fed into our translator to Why, and the result analyzed by Why, three proof obligations are produced. One is naturally for proving the assertion, the two corresponding to the addition x+y in the source code, and once at line 14, which amount to store the 80-bit value of the x87 stack into a 64-bit memory cell.
These three obligations are proved valid using the Gappa automatic prover.
If we compile the program in SSE2 mode (Streaming SIMD Extensions, 64-bits precision arithmetic) then the generated proof obligation corresponding to the assertion cannot be proved anymore. The modied assertion z == 1.0 + 0x1p-52 can be proved instead. As seen on this example, our approach produces proof obligations to show that the program satises its specication, but also to show the absence of overow in FP computations. Indeed there is no overow in this version because the result of multiplication is not temporarily stored into a 64-bit register. Finally, notice that we can also analyze the code compiled in the SSE2 mode, resulting in 3 obligations: overows for the multiplication and division and check divisor is not null. As expected, it cannot be proved that multiplication does not overow.
Example: KB3D
Our next example illustrates the handling of function calls, and the way we express properties on rounding errors across functions. This example is an excerpt of the KB3D collision detection and resolution system developed by Dowek and Munoz [21] and formally proved in PVS, but using exact calculations on real
numbers. An analysis of the same code but with oating-point calculations was done by Boldo and Nguyen [10] using their architecture-independent approach.
The annotated C source is given on Figure 4 . The logical symbol l_sign returns the sign of a real number: 1 for positive and -1 for negative (sign of zero is not pertinent). The C function sign returns the sign of a FP number x. To make sure that the result is correct, a precondition requires that the rounding error on previous computation on x (written as x − \exact(x)) is between bounds e 1 and e 2 given as arguments. The C function eps_line then attempts to decide whether a aircraft at position sx, sy with velocity vx, vy Feeding this annotated source code in our assembly analyser in SSE2 mode, each VC is automatically proved valid using either Gappa or one of the SMT solvers Alt-Ergo or CVC3. The bound E is indeed in that case exactly the same as the one found by Boldo and Nguyen [10] in a strict IEEE-754 mode. At least on this example, this shows that SSE2 assembly conforms strictly to the standard.
The table below shows the value of E that are proved correct using various architecture-dependent settings.
The FMA setting 4 asks to use the fused-multiply-add operation, which computes expressions of the form x * y ± z with only one rounding [1] . As expected, using FMA improves over SSE2 (25% less) since fewer roundings occur. The extended precision of x87 is even better (around 50% less whatever the optimization level). VCs. In particular, to make Gappa solve the VCs on the accumulated rounding error, it is necessary to guarantee that p remains bounded: it appears to be bounded by NMAX (1 + B) . 
Underlying Technique
The core of our technique is to interpret the assembly code into the input language of Why. First we describe the general principles to follow, then we show how we interpret the various assembly statements. Due to the lack of space and the large number of dierent assembly instructions to handle, we only present a few of them. We focus on the support of FP arithmetic which is the point of interest in this paper. We refer to our technical report [30] for more details.
Principles of interpretation in Why
In the input language of Why, one can dene a pure model in the logic world by declaring abstract sort names, declaring logic symbols operating on these sorts and posing rst-order axioms to axiomatize the behavior of these symbols.
Equality and both integer and real arithmetic are built-in in the logic. One can then declare a set of references which are mutable variables denoting logic values.
Finally, one can dene procedures which can modify these references. The body of such a procedure is made of statements in a while-style language. Procedures are also equipped with pre-and post-conditions. The Why VC generator then produces the necessary VCs to ensures that the body respects the post-condition.
One can alternatively just declare procedures by only giving pre-and postconditions, but also declaring the set of modied references. This feature allows us to declare how the atomic operations on a given data type behave. It is exemplied below.
Model of data Machine integers and Floating-Point Numbers
The Why logic has unbounded mathematical integers and reals only. We reuse the modeling of machine integers provided by the Jessie plug-in of Frama-C [28] . This is done as follows for 32-bit integers; the type int64 is modelled similarly. type int32 logic integer_of_int32: int32 -> int predicate is_int32(x:int) = -2147483648 <= x and x <= 2147483647 axiom int32_coerce: forall x:int32. is_int32(integer_of_int32(x)) An abstract type int32 for 32-bit integers is declared, together with a function integer_of_int32 returning the value such a machine integer denotes. The predicate is_int32 checks whether an integer is in the range of a 32-bit word or not, and we pose an axiom to specify that the value denoted by an int32 is always in this range.
To model FP numbers, we reuse the modeling of 32-and 64-bit oats dened by Ayad and Marché [2] , which introduces the corresponding abstract types single and double. We Model of the memory Interpreting memory access and update at the level of assembly is a major issue, since unlike high-level languages, we have no type information to help interpretation of raw data. In particular a given 64-bit word can be indierently interpreted as an integer or a memory address. The memory is thus interpreted as a large array of data indexed by integers. However, without type information we would need to know how to encode and decode structured data, like FP numbers, into sequences of bits. Encoding and decoding are dened by complex computations that cannot be handle easily in a purely logical context: the generated VCs would be largely polluted with decoding and encoding hence would unlikely be proved by automatic provers.
We thus decide to keep a typed model of memory instead. This implies that we cannot handle C sources which non type-safe operations: pointer casts and union types. 
Interpretation of Assembly Instructions
Operands An operand is either an immediate constant, a register or a memory reference. Simple instructions for copying (with name typically starting with mov) and arithmetic operations have an output operand called destination and one or more input operands called sources. There are indeed 6 dierent interpretations of a source operand depending on the type of the expected value. We denote by opr int32 , opr int64 , opr single , opr double and opr binary80 the interpretation of a source operand, respectively as a 32-bit, 64-bit integers and a 32-bit, 64-bit and 80-bit FP number. We also denote by opr exact its abstract \exact value. Notice how this interpretation abstracts away from bitwise representation details.
Similarly, the Why procedure move_reg_to_mem64 is declared as parameter move_reg_to_mem64: r:register -> addr:int -> { } unit writes int64M, doubleM, exactM { integer_of_int64(select(int64M, addr)) = integer_of_int64(sel_int64(r)) and double_value(select(doubleM, addr)) = double_value(sel_double(r)) and select(exactM, addr) = sel_exact(r) and forall a:int. not (addr <= a <= addr+7) -> integer_of_int64(select(int64M,a))=integer_of_int64(select(int64M@,a)) and double_value(select(doubleM,a))=double_value(select(doubleM@,a)) and select(exactM,a) =select(exactM@,a)) }
The @ sign in a Why post-condition denotes the value of a variable before the call. Thus, the quantied part of the post-condition above amounts to specifying that the rest of the memory is unmodied.
SSE2 Scalar Arithmetic Instructions Instructions for arithmetic operations
of the SSE family operate on 32-or 64-bit integers or oats, depending on the sux. The destination is always a register. Here is the interpretation of the multiplication, other operations being similar (with an additional precondition for division to check the divisor is not zero). For example, in optimized x87 assembly code compiled from Fig. 5 , the topof-stack pointer has value 1 at the loop entrance, because p is stored in the stack.
Note that this way of interpreting the x87 stack, instead of considering the stack as an array, greatly improves the verication of VCs by Gappa back-end, since it does not know the theory of arrays as SMT solvers do.
Instructions for loading in the stack and storing from the stack are interpreted as follows.
fstl reg i = set_double st0 binary80 st0 exact !reg fstl mem i = set_double_mem st0 binary80 st0 exact mem addr where set_80 is the analogous of set_double for 80-bit FP numbers.
Arithmetic instructions in the stack are interpreted as follows (for fmul, fadd and fsub being similar).
fmull src i = set_80 ( st0 binary80 * src double ) ( st0 exact * src exact ) st0 fmul %st(i), %st(j) i = set_80 ( stj binary80 * sti binary80 ) ( stj exact * sti exact ) stj
Translation of Annotated Functions
Assume that we have a function with preconditions, post-conditions and assertions. The translation of this function in assembly language to Why is illustrated in Figure 6 . Our preprocessing moved the post-condition to the end of the function. More generally, each annotation is preprocessed into an inline assembly instruction of the form asm("/* <keyword> P */"::"X"(x 0 ),..,"X"(x n )); We proceed dierently by interpreting the arbitrary control ow graph of the assembly into a nite set of small pieces of codes, where loop invariants play the role of pre-or post-conditions. This technique is not the purpose of this paper and indeed is not original: we refer to our report [30] and earlier work done above Boogie [3] or Why [22] for more details.
Conclusion
An early work on verication of machine code is due to Boyer and Yu in 1992 [11] .
They formalize the assembly language of a particular micro-processor and its operational semantics in Nqthm, and were able to verify a few programs, specied in Nqthm too. Their approach provides a deep embedding of assembly code, whereas ours is based on a shallow embedding: assembly code is simulated in Why. In our approach, behaviors are specied in the general-purpose ACSL language, and the proofs can be conducted with a large set of automated provers.
Former studies on the verication of assembly code are in the context of the so-called proof-carrying-code [15] , where proof obligations for safety (of memory dereferencing, absence of overow, etc.) are generated on the object code.
However these do not consider any behavioral specication language to specify deeper properties than safety. Although, it is worth noting that there is an 6 As specied by the constraint "X", see http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/ Simple-Constraints.html identied need to generate loop invariants in the target code to explicitate compilation choices [15, 31] . In 2006, Burdy and Pavlova [13] consider a specication language on Java bytecode. Barthe et al. [6] showed how proofs of VCs at source level can be reused for proving VCs at bytecode level, but they do not admit compiler optimizations. In 2008, Myreen [29] proposes to compile assembly code into functions in the HOL4 system. Our approach is somewhat close to this, using Why as target language instead of HOL4. Where Myreen must perform the proofs within HOL4, we can use various automatic provers thanks to the multi-prover feature of Why.
As far as we know, nobody ever considered any aspect of FP computations behavioral verication at the level of assembly.
We believe that what we present in this paper is the rst method being able to prove architecture-and compilerdependent behavioral properties of FP programs.
Our approach and our prototype implementation demonstrate that handling architecture-dependent aspects is indeed possible. However it is clearly not mature enough for a non-expert user, because there are a lot of open issues. First, some languages features are not supported at the C level (like pointer casts) and also at the assembly level. Second, we are not always able to interpret all the compiler optimizations. For example we do not support inlining of functions. We believe that to go further, we should integrate our approach into the compiler itself, following the ideas of proof-carrying-code: the optimizations made by the compiler should also produce annotations of the generated assembly (assertions, loop invariants) to make the optimizations explicit.
